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John F. Scarpa Conference on Law,
Politics, and Culture
INTRODUCTION
IN 2003, John F. Scarpa endowed a Chair in Catholic Legal Studies at
Villanova University. The Scarpa Chair is the first of its kind in Ameri-
can legal education, and one of its principal aims is to support and stimu-
late scholarly research and reflection that defy the usual borders that
segregate law and religion. The annual John F. Scarpa Conference on
Law, Politics, and Culture seeks to bring scholars of varied perspectives
into conversation on social questions that are both timely and enduring,
with a special emphasis on the often ignored questions that lurk in the
background and often silently dictate the outcomes in the sexier debates
that dominate the headlines. The late Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., andJus-
tice Antonin Scalia of the Supreme Court of the United States delivered
the keynote addresses at the first two Scarpa Conferences, and were de-
voted, respectively, to the nature of the state/government and to the terms
of the judicial office.
The third annual Scarpa Conference was held at Villanova University
on February 19, 2009, and we at Villanova hope that this issue of the Villa-
nova Law Review will be of value to readers interested in religious liberty
and freedom of conscience. Professor Martha Nussbaum, the Ernst
Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at the University
of Chicago, delivered the keynote address, which summarized the spirited
arguments of her recent and much-discussed book Liberty of Conscience: In
Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality. The seven papers col-
lected here were presented at the Conference. All but one are responses
to various arguments developed in Nussbaum's book. The one exception
is Professor Nussbaum's own response, on the occasion of the Conference,
to all the other papers presented that day. Read together, Professor Nuss-
baum's response and the other papers present a model of how academic
discourse can advance mutual understanding.
The sometimes deadly fallout from differences in religion are a scan-
dal to believers and nonbelievers alike. Such differences are not likely to
go away. Meanwhile, should some consciences sometimes be coerced? Al-
ternatively, should conscience be respected? Or, when it is formed on the
(579)
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basis of religious belief, should conscience be merely tolerated? Should
churches be recognized? Or should only consciences be respected or tol-
erated? These are just some of the questions addressed in the papers that
follow. I would like to thank Professor Nussbaum for sharing her time and
talent with us at Villanova and, through this issue, with the larger commu-
nity that cares about such questions. For all of those who have made Villa-
nova a place where such conversation can go forward, and for all those
who worked to see this volume into print (above all the Villanova Law Re-
view editors), I also offer my thanks.
Patrick McKinley Brennan
John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies &
Professor of Law
Villanova University School of Law
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RELIGION, CONSCIENCE, AND EQUALITY*
KENT GREENAWALT
T HIS essay reflects my response to Martha Nussbaum's striking and
powerful book Liberty of Conscience.1 Most but not all of what I say
touches in one-way or another on the basic theme of equality. Some of my
points may seem narrow or picky, but I believe in the main they bear on
how strongly the historical tradition supports Nussbaum's approach or,
more important, on how we now should view the values of liberty of con-
science and equality in respect to religion.
How should religious beliefs and organizations figure in our political
life? At no time in recent memory has this question aroused the passion it
has in the beginning of this century. Former President George W. Bush
reiterated the centrality of his evangelical Christian beliefs throughout his
term in office, and the Supreme Court radically altered the law of the free
exercise and establishment of religion.
We can distinguish roughly four related questions about religion and
government, each with constitutional and nonconstitutional dimensions.
The first question is: What accommodations should government make to
the exercise of religion? Should it exempt religious pacifists from military
duty, permit Amish parents to withdraw their children from school after
the eighth grade, or allow the Native American Church to use peyote dur-
ing worship? Should any such privileges from ordinary legal requirements
be extended to individuals with strong nonreligious reasons? How far
should legislators decide these matters? How far should courts go as part
of enforcing the Constitution?
The second question concerns the government's sponsoring or en-
dorsing particular understandings of religious truth. Should public school
teachers lead prayers or complement the teaching of evolution with ideas
of intelligent design? Should winter holiday displays in public parks in-
clude creches? Should the Pledge of Allegiance contain the words "under
God"? Do these practices amount to forbidden establishments of religion?
Related questions arise about the discourse of high officials. Should they,
as President George W. Bush did, keep referring to their own religious
convictions and employ rhetorical tropes that appeal to co-believers?
The third question involves financial assistance. Religious groups of-
fer a wide range of social services, including hospitals, adoption agencies,
food kitchens, drug rehabilitation programs, and schools. Should public
money assist these endeavors, so long as the state does not favor any partic-
* This essay is a modestly revised version of a piece that appeared in THE NEW
YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS May 15, 2008, under the title of Where Shall the Preaching
Stap?.
1. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2008).
(581)
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ular religion or favor religious efforts over nonreligious ones? If the gov-
ernment can, consistent with the Establishment Clause, pay for these
services, should it? If so, what conditions should it set regarding those
who receive and provide the services? More particularly, when it pays the
bill, should it bar religious discrimination and should it ensure that none
of its money goes to proselytizing or other religious efforts? Parallel to
questions about direct government aid are ones about when religious or-
ganizations and individuals who contribute to them should receive relief
from property, sales, and income taxes.
The fourth question, although a staple of political philosophy during
the last few decades, is the least understood. It concerns inputs into the
political processes-bases for decisions and explanations that citizens and
officials offer for their positions. The view that everyone should rely on
"public reasons" in politics stands opposed to the claim that people should
rely on whatever premises they find most convincing. Any initial thought
that people relying on religious bases necessarily promote their religion is
mistaken. Consider the impoverished lives of animals subjected to factory
farming: if a person supports a law to create a more tolerable existence for
animals raised for human consumption, because she believes God made
other animals, not purely for human benefit but as independently valua-
ble creatures deserving a modicum of care from us, she does not sponsor
her religion. Instead, she uses her deep understanding of reality to pro-
tect entities that deserve protection. The idea that people should rely on
public reasons does not simply follow from the principle that government
should not promote religion.
In Liberty of Conscience, Professor Nussbaum offers answers to these
questions. Governments should make accommodations to the concerns of
religious conscience and should extend these to the expressions of non-
religious conscience as well. 2 Governments should not engage in any gen-
uine endorsement of religion, however inclusive. 3 Religious groups and
individuals should participate on an equal basis in programs that aid non-
governmental providers of social services. In fleeting passages, Nussbaum
indicates her adherence to the position favoring reliance on "public rea-
sons" in our political life.
Lying at the heart of Professor Nussbaum's approach is her claim that
shielding religious conscience is supremely important for any society that
respects individuals and treats them with dignity. For her, conscience is
not limited to convictions about how people should act. It is "the faculty
in human beings with which they search for life's ultimate meaning."4
Any society that acknowledges the equality of citizens should respect their
consciences equally-a respect extending to nonbelievers. According to
Nussbaum, the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses should be under-
2. See id. at Ch. 4.
3. See id. at 259.
4. Id. at 19.
[Vol. 54: p. 581
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stood mainly to guarantee equal liberty of conscience. This overarching
approach does not eliminate many difficult exercises in judgment, and
courts rightly leave some issues to legislative resolution. She argues, how-
ever, that courts should not abdicate the task of protecting liberty of con-
science to the legislative and executive branches.
Much of Liberty of Conscience displays various applications of Nuss-
baum's general theory, but we can better see why this theory matters if we
understand some of the rejected alternatives. She opposes the Supreme
Court's present doctrine that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect
religious practice against reasonable general laws. A general law against
the use of peyote should not bar a constitutional claim to use it in worship
services. She also opposes a focus on a person's degree of religious liberty
that is inattentive to how that liberty compares with the liberty of others.
If religious conscientious objectors are exempted from military service,
nonreligious conscientious objectors should receive the same treatment
In respect to the Establishment Clause, Nussbaum rejects the narrow
interpretation that it forbids only the promotion of particular religious
faiths, or only coercive government practices, or reaches only the federal
government (not the states). She does not altogether rule out broad sepa-
rationist theories that close ties between government and religion that are
bad for religion and bad for government (quite apart from concerns
about equality). She assigns those considerations a decidedly subordinate
place in her general theory.
Nussbaum defends her thesis by weaving together philosophy, legal
doctrine, and history. Because she does not suppose thatjudges should be
wedded either to the original understanding of various constitutional
clauses or the precise reasoning of earlier cases, her fundamental argu-
ment-made with force, eloquence, and occasional oversimplification-
need not rest on any specific account of history or prior decisions. Partly
to persuade those whose views about constitutional adjudication differ,
Nussbaum lines up historical and judicial sources in support. I shall sug-
gest that some important aspects of these accounts are one-sided in vari-
ous ways.
In ably rendering complex constitutional issues comprehensible to
nonlawyers, Nussbaum recognizes nuances about legal issues that advo-
cates on both sides often miss. An Episcopalian who converted to Reform
Judaism, and remains seriously religious, she shows that not only skeptics
but also deeply religious citizens can welcome a political order in which
governments refrain from promoting religion. On this subject, she offers
many appealing proposals for resolutions of highly contested issues.
Recognizing strong counter-movements, Nussbaum nevertheless as-
serts that the dominant ideal in American history has been respect for an
equal liberty of conscience. Early on, she asserts that the country "respects
2009]
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people's committed search for a way of life."5 It "has long understood that
liberty of conscience is worth nothing if it is not equal."
6
We may assume that the "worth nothing" phrase is not Professor Nuss-
baum's considered view. She rightly contends that any country with an
established religion does not respect various religious consciences equally.
A country with a weak establishment that grants generous liberty of con-
science, such as Great Britain, is surely preferable to outright oppression
of all but the favored faith.
This rhetorical slip is of little moment, but as someone who is not a
historian, I was troubled by some historical assertions Nussbaum offers.
She writes that the Pilgrims crossed the ocean to recover a space of "liberty
and equality" denied them in England, but that the settlers forgot the les-
son of equality implicit in their first Thanksgiving. 7 The early Pilgrims,
seeking a haven for their own faith, were tolerant of diverse religious out-
looks but hardly had a developed philosophy of equal respect for con-
science. The more numerous Puritans who soon followed explicitly
rejected such notions, less because of the harsh conditions Nussbaum em-
phasizes than a conviction that their "City upon a Hill" should be con-
structed according to their religious premises.
Professor Nussbaum devotes a substantial chapter to Roger Williams,
whose Rhode Island society practiced religious toleration and who de-
fended broad liberty of conscience in The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution,8 well
beforeJohn Locke's influential A Letter Concerning Toleration.9 Williams be-
lieved that people of diverse religious understandings, capable of morally
virtuous lives, could build a common life together. Unlike Locke, he per-
ceived the vulnerability of conscience, regarding persecution as "soul
rape."
Contrary to a typical view premised on Williams's extensive use of the-
ological language and his unremitting opinion that true Christians-a
small number-should separate their religious practices from the unre-
generate mass, Nussbaum suggests that Williams's conclusions about con-
science did not rest heavily on his own theological understandings. 10 She
goes further in treating John Rawls's work as articulating and developing
Williams's ideas. Rawls prominently claimed that members of a liberal de-
mocracy should not rely on their own religious perspectives and other
5. Id. at 2.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 34-37.
8. ROGER WiLiAMs, THE BLOUDY TENET OF PERSECUTION (1644).
9. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Prometheus
1990) (1689).
10. See gmerally TIMOTHY HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WIL-
LIAMS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1998); PEREZ ZAGORIN, How THE IDEA OF RELIGIOUS
TOLERATION CAME TO THE WEST (2003).
[Vol. 54: p. 581
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"comprehensive" views to decide fundamental political issues, but rather
seek shared premises and common ways of discovering facts.1'
Nussbaum frequently refers to Williams as a paradigm for our tradi-
tions. Unfortunately, his systematic writings failed to exercise significant
influence in the colonies and early republic. When Nussbaum speaks of
"the success of his arguments," it is unclear whether the reader is to infer
that outsiders were much affected by Rhode Island practices or indepen-
dently came to embrace ideas similar to his.1 2
In respect to Williams, we can inquire into the foundation of his posi-
tions, his influence, and his relevance for modern understandings of relig-
ion and the state. Nussbaum quotes some passages that, read in isolation,
could be taken as making claims that do not rest on religious grounds.
For me, few, if any, of these passages strongly indicate that Williams's
moral notions of religious liberty and impartiality were genuinely de-
tached from his religious views, which I assume were the mainspring of his
life. I doubt that the occasional passages that do not directly rely on relig-
ious premises show those premises have faded into insignificance in re-
spect to the claims the passages make. 13 If one asks what Williams actually
believed or how his readers understood him, I am skeptical one would
have discovered him to be making arguments wholly detached from his
religious premises. Even if this skeptical view reflects probable reality, it
certainly does not mean we are unable to draw from him such detached
arguments. Were we to accept a form of historical interpretation that re-
lates the past to our present concerns, along the lines of Hans-Georg
Gadamer, we might consider these as a historical interpretation of his
work. 
14
In any event, the crucial relevance for Nussbaum's overall project is
what we can draw from the ideas Williams expressed, not the relation of
one idea to the other. For that purpose, we can certainly take these
passages as independent from religious premises. Somewhat ironically, if
they were genuinely inseparable from the religious premises, that might
actually increase the appeal of separationist arguments for conservative
Christians. Nothing in the chapter on Williams leads me to think he be-
11. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 57.
12. See id. at 44. One scholar writes of Williams having "no apparent influ-
ence" in the century after his death in 1683, and of Rhode Island as a "despised
outcast," regarded by most Americans "as a kind of social outhouse." HALL, supra
note 10, at 116. Nevertheless, he sees the positions of Williams as representing a
cogent defense from a stance of dogmatic religious separationism for religious lib-
erty and disestablishment. See id. at 117.
13. Although, as David Little asserts, Williams may have understood the foun-
dation of political authority as not religious, this does not entail that the perspec-
tive for making this judgment is not religious. See David Little, "Liberty of
Conscience". An Exchange, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BooKs, June 12, 2008, at 82, available
at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21518.
14. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (2nd Rev. ed. 1989). One
might think of a similar exercise with regard to certain passages in ST. AUGUS-
TINE'S, CrlY OF GOD (1984).
20091
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lieved citizens should put aside their Christian understandings in deciding
whether their governments should aid the poor or protect seriously im-
paired infants.
The exact extent of Williams's influence is irrelevant for Nussbaum's
main concern, which is to sketch an appealing account of religious liberty
rooted in our traditions. In this effort, her sketch of the history of anti-
Catholic bias relates more directly to her interpretation of the Establish-
ment Clause. That history is relevant to whether concern about state sup-
port of institutional religion has a solid ground, apart from concerns
about equality. 15
In a chapter called "Fearing Strangers," which also describes the ap-
palling treatment of Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses, Nussbaum's
theme is that anti-Catholic bias in the mid-nineteenth century, directed
against immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, generated an em-
phasis on separation of church and state by nativists who, all the while,
were entirely comfortable with Protestant public schools. 16 Intellectual
liberals in the mid-twentieth century, fueling the modern opposition to
aid for parochial schools, were also biased against Catholics-failing to
recognize the Church's long history of rational, natural law approaches to
morality and politics. Moreover, they were unaware of the rigorous,
thoughtful education provided in leading Catholic schools and neglectful
of liberal Catholic thinkers, such as Jacques Maritain and John Courtney
Murray.
Nussbaum disregards or underemphasizes other important facts re-
garding anti-Catholic bias. Centuries earlier, within dominantly Protestant
colonies, anti-Catholic sentiment was extremely powerful. No stranger to
the colonists, Catholicism was the widely perceived enemy of true belief.
Jonathan Edwards, the leader of the Great Awakening, expressed a com-
mon view when he spoke of the Pope as the Antichrist and regarded the
Catholic Church as representing evil in the cosmic struggle against
good.17 Later nineteenth-century prejudice built on the long, rich history
of hostility. Opponents of aid to Catholic schools did not, as Nussbaum
implies, lack evidence about the church's hostility toward political liber-
alism. An 1832 Papal Encyclical condemned the "absurd ... proposition
which claims that liberty of conscience must be maintained for everyone.
It spreads ruin in sacred and civil affairs ..."18 Only through the Second
15. For a recent book that is more relaxed about government expression than
Nussbaum and stricter about aid to institutional religion, see NOAH FELDMAN, Di-
VIDED BY GOD (2005).
16. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 175.
17. See GEORGE M. MARSDEN, JONATHAN EDWARDS: A LIFE (2003).
18. POPE GREGORY XVI, MIRANI Vos: ON LIBERALISM AND RELIGIOUS INDIFFER-
ENTISM (1832). Three decades later, Pope Pius IX endorsed Gregory's view that
the idea of liberty of conscience as a personal right was an "insanity." See POPE PIus
IX, QUANTA CARA: CONDEMNING CURRENT ERRORS (1864).
[Vol. 54: p. 581
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Vatican Council in 1965 did the Church embrace a robust liberty of relig-
ious conscience.
Various leading separationists grossly overstated any Roman Catholic
threat to American democracy, but their misgivings about aid to Catholic
schools had some ground in authoritative church teachings and actual
school practices. Although the church's rich philosophic traditions per-
meated its best schools, run by Jesuits and other religious orders, parish
school education, which provided the bulk of Catholic schooling in the
United States during most of the twentieth century, was usually more nar-
row and dogmatic. These practices have shifted significantly, with the
great influence of Vatican II and with the increasing replacement of nuns
and priests with lay teachers. When Nussbaum writes, "[m]ost Americans
can see by now that Roman Catholicism . . . favors and teaches indepen-
dence of mind," she does not remark that this altered perception is partly
the consequence of a changed underlying reality.1 9
The modern issue for which it matters most whether someone sees
equality or institutional separation as the heart of nonestablishment is gov-
ernment aid to religious education. Governments, uncontroversially, help
finance religious groups providing other social services, such as hospitals
and adoption agencies, so long as nonreligious providers are treated
equally. It is widely agreed that public money should not pay for religious
practices directly. Moreover, most agree that organizations receiving pub-
lic funds must make their services available to all regardless of their
religion.
The sticking point-not discussed by Nussbaum-is discrimination in
employment. The Bush administration consistently maintained that relig-
ious providers relying on public money should be able to use religious
criteria in choosing staff. Congressional resistance to this feature of the
administration's legislative proposals for broad Charitable Choice resulted
in a stalemate, allowing the administration to do most of what it wanted by
executive order. 20 Although allowing religious groups to choose like-
minded workers may serve the members' religious aspirations, the use of
religious criteria creates an obvious inequality among those seeking
work-one that is unjustified for positions not central to religious practice
and education.
This national and local controversy over aid to religious activities has
been centered on religious education. In the late nineteenth century,
Congress nearly approved a constitutional amendment to bar such aid.
Many states then adopted similar amendments to their own constitutions.
In 1947, the Supreme Court, in Everson v. Board of Education,2 1 allowed
NewJersey to pay bus transportation costs for children attending parochial
19. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 298.
20. At the time of this writing, the Obama administration had not determined
just how far to alter the guidelines of its predecessor.
21. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
2009] 587
9
Brennan and Scarpa: Introduction
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
schools, butJustice Black's opinion for the Court contained strong separa-
tionist language. For Nussbaum, the theme of equality dominated his dis-
cussion, but the opinion emphasized outright separation of church and
government. The fact that equality was notJustice Black's central idea was
confirmed by his later dissent in Board of Education v. Allen,2 2 when the
Court confirmed New York's provision of textbooks for parochial school
students. If Justice Black were mainly guided by equality considerations,
textbooks would not have seemed so different from bus transportation.
Instead, Justice Black thought books involved the state in "the heart" of
religious education.2 3
In 2002, the Supreme Court approved Cleveland's voucher program,
which granted substantial reimbursement to parents of children in private
schools.2 4 The great majority of schools qualifying for this aid were relig-
ious. Acknowledging the role of public schools in integrating our hetero-
geneous population, Nussbaum calls the case "genuinely difficult"-one
instance of her refreshing recognition that in many Supreme Court cases
both sides have strong arguments. 25 She recognizes that law's complexity
is largely responsive to variations among circumstances, rather than a de-
vice of lawyers to befuddle others. Cleveland's program set reimburse-
ment at a level likely to prove more attractive for use at religious schools
than other private schools, which expend more per pupil. Of course, the
financial aid involved the government deeply in education by religious in-
stitutions. If one concentrates on the state's assisting parents toward an
equal chance to realize their educational aspirations, however, the Court's
approval is sound.
Judicial resolution of the voucher issue-unlikely to be overruled-
has shifted the focus from courts to legislatures. Thus far, concern that
public schools will suffer if private education receives substantial subsidies,
pressure by teachers' organizations, and, perhaps, a worry about the in-
creasing number of strongly evangelical Protestant schools have proved
formidable obstacles to the enactment of broad statewide voucher pro-
grams. Yet, an interesting constitutional issue remains: do state constitu-
tions that forbid aid to parochial education violate the federal Free
Exercise Clause by treating religion unfavorably? In 2004, the Supreme
Court decided by a 7-2 margin that despite a general program to aid col-
lege students, a state may leave out those who plan to earn a "degree in
theology," one "devotional in nature or designed to induce religious
faith."26 Treating such studies as preparation for the ministry, the Court
concluded that a state could choose not to support them. Although this
decision points toward the Court's acceptance of broader state restrictions
22. 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting). In her book, Nussbaum did
not discuss Allen.
23. See id. at 253.
24. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
25. See NUSSBAuIM, supra note 1, at 302.
26. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
[Vol. 54: p. 581
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on aid to religious education, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion is too
opaque to allow a confident prediction. Nussbaum's view considering the
Court's decision as mistaken may suggest that her emphasis on equality
leads her to underrate the value of keeping government out of the core
functions of institutional religion. 27
When it comes to governments themselves engaging in religious prac-
tices or teaching religious ideas, the Supreme Court has been fairly strict,
forbidding them to sponsor oral prayers, bible reading, and instruction in
creationism within public schools. Additionally, the Court forbade dis-
plays of creches and the Ten Commandments that convey a religious mes-
sage. Building on a prior test requiring that a practice is unconstitutional
if its purpose or effect aids religion, the crucial swing vote in many religion
cases, Justice O'Connor, created a test. This test asks whether a state is
endorsing or promoting a religious view by its actions. Nussbaum agrees
with this approach, which is designed to prevent members of minority reli-
gions or nonbelievers from feeling like outsiders. She thinks that a faith-
ful application of that approach would accept "In God We Trust" on coins,
but would not countenance "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance re-
cited by public school students. She, thus, disagrees with O'Connor's own
unpersuasive conclusion, in a case in which the Court's majority side-
stepped the constitutional issue and held that "under God" does not really
endorse a religious view, but has been transformed into an exercise of
ceremonial deism. 28 The recent Presidential Inauguration, with its
lengthy invocation and benediction, certainly reminds us that religion has
yet to fade from our most important public ceremonies.
In 1990, the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v.
Smith29 radically altered the constitutional doctrine about accommoda-
tions to religious exercise. A quarter of a century earlier, the Court had
determined that a state could not bar a woman from receiving unemploy-
ment compensation because she was unwilling to accept employment re-
quiring Saturday work, when her unwillingness rested on her conviction as
a Seventh-day Adventist that she should not work on that day.30 The
Court announced that the state could not justify this impairment of her
religious liberty without a compelling interest in doing so. Providing a
rich account of Mrs. Sherbert, the plaintiff, and of the employment prac-
tices in her locale, Nussbaum approves the decision's standard of judg-
ment as affording due respect to religious conscience.3 ' In stressing that
the state treated Saturday worshippers worse than those who worship on
Sunday, Nussbaum transforms what was a supplementary ground into the
opinion's major theme. She resists, however, any theory that the Free Ex-
27. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 303.
28. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
29. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
30. See Sherbert v. Vermer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
31. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 136-37.
2009]
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ercise Clause is only about unequal treatment, claiming instead that it calls
for significant protection of religious conscience.
Most scholars agree with Nussbaum's judgment that the Constitution
should be understood to require that governments accommodate religious
conviction, though when she speaks of "a very workable and clear-edged
doctrine," she understates the difficulty of assessing burdens on religion
and the weight of state interests. 3 2 Suppose, for example, it is left to
judges to determine whether the government should be able to recover
money that a debtor filing for bankruptcy recently has tithed to his
church. It is no simple exercise to decide how much this interferes with
religious practices and how important is the government's interest in re-
trieving the money.
The Supreme Court's other major case protecting free exercise al-
lowed a group of Old Order Amish to withdraw their children from school
after eighth grade despite a state law requiring they stay in school, or re-
ceive comparable schooling at home, until the age of sixteen. 33 As Nuss-
baum recognizes, because withdrawal from school may well stunt the
future development and vocational opportunities of some Amish children,
this case, with powerful competing arguments, was hard.
Subsequently, the Court rejected the claim of a Jewish psychologist in
the Air Force to wear his yarmulke indoors.3 4 The Court said that the
military deserved extraordinary deference to decide what promotes
healthy discipline. The Supreme Court also ruled against the claims of
Native Americans to prevent a development of government land that
would destroy the quiet of a sacred locale.3 5 Government development of
its own land is not a "prohibition" of free exercise covered by the First
Amendment. Nussbaum suggests that the Court in this case regarded the
relevant burden as not substantial, but the opinion says that the govern-
ment could build its road even if it "virtually destroy[ed] the ... Indians'
ability to practice their religion."36
Few observers realized that the majorities in both cases were poised to
abandon the compelling interest test in situations in which people violate
laws not specifically directed against religion. This happened in Smith,
which rejected the constitutional claim of members of the Native Ameri-
can Church to use peyote in their worship services.3 7 As Professor Nuss-
baum recounts, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court manipulated the
substance of the prior cases in astonishing ways in a vain effort to demon-
strate continuity-not an uncommon strategy when the Court shifts con-
stitutional doctrine. Few readers were fooled. Outrage was the response
32. See id. at 145.
33. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
34. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
35. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
36. Compare id. at 464 with NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 140.
37. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
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of many scholars and the vast majority of significant religious organiza-
tions and groups devoted to civil liberties.
The upshot has been two important pieces of federal legislation. Ad-
ditionally, similar laws in at least thirteen states and judicial decisions in
others have sought to address this issue. All reimpose the language of the
substantial burden-compelling interest approach. The Congressional re-
sponse was accepted by a unanimous Court.38 Even Justice Scalia, who has
a strong distaste for standards whose application is unclear, signed onto
the opinion.
As a caution about what I have written here, I should note that I never
regarded this free exercise test as a strict compelling interest test.3 9 This is
unlike the one that applies to racial classifications and outright restraints
on expression. The free exercise test has been, and should be, one that
involves intermediate scrutiny.
The more difficult question about accommodation is what to do
about analogous nonreligious conscience. Nussbaum spends considerable
time on two conscientious objector cases, agreeing with the Court that
genuine pacifists who are not religious in any ordinary sense should be
treated like religious pacifists. 40 The Court tortured the language of the
federal statute to reach this result, rather than stating a constitutional re-
quirement. But what should be done about nonreligious drug users and a
nonreligious right to spend Saturdays with children? One might defend a
limitation to religious claims if analogous, powerful nonreligious claims
are unlikely-e.g., the right to withdraw children from school-or the
granting of nonreligious claims would create great dangers of fraud, such
as claims for the use of illegal drugs. Nussbaum expresses herself as
"somewhat nervous" with the suggestion of an author (myself) along these
lines and is hesitant to differentiate drug cases from exemptions from mili-
tary service. 4 1 She also suggests that claims to stay home with one's family
on Saturday lack constitutional status.
I believe this precise combination of positions is difficult to defend.
With any psychedelic drug, such as LSD, a user can plausibly assert a
search for meaning in life. If potential protection extends to nonreligious
users, any threshold requirement that a user show he is suffering a "sub-
stantial burden" will disappear, because we have no way to decide when a
prohibition on nonreligious use imposes a substantial burden. The state,
of course, could still prohibit use by everyone if it has a strong enough
interest in doing so. Moreover, why does Nussbaum rule out the possibil-
ity that the desire of parents to spend time with their children may raise a
serious issue of conscience? The search for meaning in the lives of many
38. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao de Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418 (2006).
39. See generally 1 KE'zr GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FAIR-
NESS AND FREE EXERCISE (2006).
40. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 170-73.
41. See id. at 381 n.109.
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parents depends on involvement with loved family members, and they take
their care of their children as their highest moral responsibility. It is not
simple to distinguish the (potentially protected) nonreligious drug user
from the (unprotected) parent with a nonreligious reason to spend pre-
cious weekend days with children.
Nussbaum reverts to the last of our four questions about the place of
religion in political life near her book's end. She draws upon Rawls's no-
tion of an overlapping consensus, implying that, at least on fundamental
issues, citizens and officials alike should rely on nonreligious grounds for
political judgments. 42 Nussbaum's valid concern about equality of citizens
provides a strong basis to conclude that officials should not run for office
on the basis of their religious understandings and should engage in politi-
cal discourse that does not rely on particular religious outlooks or disre-
gard nonbelievers. It hardly follows that ordinary citizens should try to
shed their religious convictions in politics or even that legislators should
attempt to do so when they resolve troubling issues like the protection of
animals. Such a conclusion would require arguments beyond those Nuss-
baum makes here.43 On this issue, there are significant arguments of
equality on both sides-one side against being compelled on bases they
cannot be expected to accept, the other side against being told not to rely
on reasons they find most convincing. My own conviction is that the bal-
ance of considerations regarding religious conscience points to a less dras-
tic exclusion of religious convictions from political judgment.44
Martha Nussbaum's Liberty of Conscience offers powerful arguments in
favor of protecting conscience and treating citizens equally. I believe
there is greater scope for granting exemptions based explicitly on religion
than she does. I also assign greater importance to values of institutional
autonomy and nonentanglement (even apart from their contributions to
conscience and equality). Moreover, my sense of a desirable constraint of
public reasons is substantially more modest than hers. Nonetheless, I be-
lieve she has eloquently captured a great deal about how we should view
relations between individual conscience and government authority.
42. See id. at 361-62.
43. For other relevant discussion by her, see MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS
OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, AND SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006).
44. My views are most fully developed in PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC
REASONS (1995) and RELIGIOUS CoNvICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988). A
summary is in 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISH-
MENT AND FAmNESS Ch. 23 (2008).
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